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We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, and capable of dealing with the same subject matter [a
crime committed in Canada by a member of the United States
armed forces] within the same territory .... Assuming for the
moment that there was but one act done by the accused, interna-
tional law has long recognized the possibility of the existence of
two concurrent jurisdictions .... In this case, jurisdiction in the
United States springs from its personal supremacy over the indi-
vidual, while Canadian jurisdiction is founded upon its sovereignty
in the place where the offense occurred.'
JUDGE GEORGE W. LATIMER
United States Court of Military Appeals
I. INTRODUCTION
Saigon's Affaire Der2 of 1867 provides a practical case by which to
introduce this interesting area of international law.3 France's Imperial
Solicitor General set forth these key facts in his petition to the Criminal
Chamber of the French Court of Cassation:
Last January 20, in the evening, a considerable gathering which
had formed on the Napoleon Quay, facing the Cafr de Paris, called
*This article is based upon a thesis presented to The Judge Advocate General's
School, U. S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, in April 1965, while the author
was a member of the Thirteenth Career Class. The opinions and conclusions
expressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of
either The Judge Advocate General's School or any other governmental agency.
tCommander, U. S. Navy. Assistant Director, Appellate Government Division,
U. S. Navy Appellate Review Activity, Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C. Instructor, U. S. Naval Justice
School, Newport, Rhode Island, 1958-61. Senior Legal Officer, U. S. Naval Sta-
tion, Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, 1961-64. A.B. 1949, J.D. 1952, Univer-
sity of Southern California; special student 1957, Harvard Law School; A.M.
(international relations) 1961, Boston University.
'United States v. Sinigar, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 330, 336-37, 20 C.M.R. 46, 52-53 (1955).
2Cour de Cassation (Ch. Crim.), Feb. 29, 1868, [1868] Sirey Recueil G~nral
I. at 351 (Fr.) (The Pearl).
3See generally, STANGER, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER VISITING ARMED FoRcEs
55-78 (U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1957-1958, vol. 52,
1965) [hereinafter cited as STANGER].
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over the policeman Mesmer. He learned that this gathering was
caused by an English sailor from the corvette [of war] The Pearl,
then tied up in Saigon, who had just violently struck a resident
of the city. To the order of the policeman to follow him, this
sailor, named Machel Der, responded with a formal refusal and
at the same time punched the member of the police force. The
latter prepared to repel this aggression when he was surrounded
by five other English sailors and thrown to the ground. It was
then that Machel Der, rushing on him again, tore all his clothing
and inflicted a wound on his forehead.4
Der was promptly prosecuted in the Correctional Police Court of
Saigon for assault and battery of a policeman, convicted, and sentenced
to nine months imprisonment. On appeal, the Superior Court of Saigon
held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, reasoning, in part, that
although art. 3, Code Napoleon, establishes territorial sovereignty
for the punishment of felonies and misdemeanors committed on
French territory, even by foreigners, there exists at the same time
a principle of international law, referred to in the decree of Feb-
ruary 21, 1808, under which soldiers under the flag and sailors
serving aboard vessels of the State are considered as being within
their own country and coming under the jurisdiction of their flag
for crimes they commit, even on land, in a neutral or friendly
country.5
The Court of Cassation upheld the trial court's jurisdiction, reasoning,
in part, that since Der's offense was committed after he "came onto
land," it did not come within
either... the decree of Feb. 21, 1808, which governs jurisdiction
for all military forces marching with their corps, under the flag, or
... the exceptions established in the law of nations and interna-
tional law for acts committed on board foreign ships, navigating,
under their nation's flag, on the high seas as well as in that area in
the neighborhood of the coasts of another nation that by general
agreement is called the territorial sea, or within one of its roads or
ports.0
4 Cour de Cassation (Ch. Crim.), Feb. 29, 1868, [1868] Sirey Recueil G~n6ral I. at
351, as translated by LT Bernard H. Oxman, USNR, International Law Division,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy, Washington,
D.C.
5Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
61d. at 352. (Emphasis added.)
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The rules of criminal jurisdiction over naval forces visiting in most
Western European nations have now been specifically delineated by
treaty. Thus in 1951, all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
member-States but one signed the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment,7 an article of which specifically defines the rules of jurisdiction
over crimes committed by a member of a NATO-member State's
armed forces while visiting within the territory of another NATO-
member State.8
Generally speaking, however, "treaties seldom govern the exercise
of jurisdiction over visiting naval vessels and their personnel." 9 In
Southeast Asia, for example, the United States has no such treaty with
Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Burma, Ceylon, and
India. And, as is clearly evidenced by the United States' experience
under its longstanding military bases agreement with the Philippines, 0
even the existence of such an agreement does not always resolve the
many problems that may arise when a serious offense is allegedly
committed by a member of a visiting naval force. For example, on
December 14, 1964, the Associated Press briefly reported from Manila:
Marine Guard Kills Filipino
MANILA, Dec. 14 (AP)-A United States marine shot and killed
a Filipino, Conzalo [sic] Villedo, last night near a store of bombs
at the United States Naval Base on Subic Bay, the Navy an-
nounced today. It was the second Filipino trespasser killed by an
American military guard in three weeks. 1'
7Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1792, T.1.A.S. No. 2846,
199 U.N.T.S. 67, 109, 48 AMi. J. Ihr'L L. Supp. 83 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
the NATO Status of Forces Agreement], signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxenbourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Tur-
key, United Kingdom, and the United States, but not by Iceland. See generally
Re, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement and International Law, 50 Nw.
U.L. Rnv. 349 (1955); Schwartz, International Law and the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 1091 (1953).
SSee generally Si'irE & PYE, SrAxus OF FoRcEs AGREEMENT: CRIMINAL JnuRsvIC-
TION (1957); Rouse & Baldwin, The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction under the
N.A.T.O. Status of Forces Agreement, 51 Ams. J. hrr'L L. 29 (1957).
9
RESTATEmENT (SEcOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW oF Tim UNITED STATes §
49, note 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as REsTATEENT].
lOAgreement With the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Military Bases,
March 14, 1947, 61 Stat. (4) 4019, T.J.A.S. No. 1775, amended by an exchange of
notes signed at Manila on Aug. 10, 1965, 16 U.S.T. & O.1.A. 1090, T.I.A.S. No.
5851.
"1N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1964, p. 14, col. 4. The earlier incident occurred at
Clark Air Base. "Clark Field, a 300-square-mile base on which 50,000 people live
and work, provides the principal logistical support for the Air Force in Vietnam.
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Within a few days, however, there was a serious reaction in several
Filipino communities to these shootings, the first of which took place
at Clark Air Base. 12 In addition, the national press gave these incidents
The naval base at Subic Bay is the chief supply and repair depot for the Seventh
Fleet." N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1965, p. 8, col. 1. The two American marines in-
volved in the Subic incident were at the time on guard duty at the U.S. Naval
Magazine, Subic Bay. They were later tried and acquitted by a Navy general
court-martial on charges of negligent homicide and willfully discharging a fire-
arm under circumstances endangering human life. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1965, p.
11, col. 4. The earlier incident, which occurred on Nov. 25, 1964, at the Clark
Air Base's Crow Valley Gunnery Range, involved the shooting of a 14-year old
Filipino trespasser who was scavenging for metal. Trumbull, US. Army's Infor-
mation Lag Angers Filipinos, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1965, p. 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 27, 1965, p. 7, col. 3. The American airman involved, an off-duty guard, was
bird hunting with a 22-caliber rifle at the time of the incident. N.Y. Times, Feb.
26, 1965, p. 2, col. 4. He was later tried and convicted by an Air Force general
court-martial on charges of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to dishonorable
discharge, confinement at hard labor for 3 years, forfeiture of all pay and allow-
ances, and reduction to the grade of airman basic. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1965, p.
7, col. 3. Except for a reduction of the dishonorable discharge to a bad con-
duct discharge, the findings and sentence were approved upon review. United States
v. Cole, ACM 19272, 35 C.M.R. 878, petition for review denied, 15 U.S.C.M.A.
689, 35 C.M.R. 478 (1965). For some years the theft of bombs and other muni-
tions from Subic and Clark has been a serious problem. For example, the Associated
Press reported from Manila on Aug. 10, 1964:
The Philippine police have seized 37 100-pound bombs that were being
transported in a truck in the vicinity of Clark Field, a United States air base,
and charged a policeman with illegal possession of explosives. They said the
bombs had apparently been stolen from the base. Charges were filed against
14 men. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1964, p. 29, col. 4.
A United States Embassy source in Manila reported on Dec. 18, 1964, that
"564 bombs were stolen at Clark Base" during 1964. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1964,
p. 7, col. 2.
12E.g., the Manila Chronicle, Dec. 21, 1964, p. 15, col. 3, reported:
BALANGA. Bataan, Dec. 20-(PNS)-Additional PC [Philippine Constabu-
lary] troops with radio equipment have been dispatched to barrio Mabayo
[the nearest Filipino community to the site of the Subic Bay incident],
Morong, to watch the restless residents of the barrio following the gun-slay-
ing of [Mabayo] fisherman Gonzalo Villedo allegedly by two United States
Marines.
Major Mamerto Manahan, provincial PC commander, said that the re-
inforcement of the PC detachment in barrio Mabayo was to prevent the
barriofolk from taking the law in their own hands.
The Morng [sic] municipal council already has reacted sharply to the slay-
ing of Villedo.
The N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1964, p. 13, col. 6, reported:
ANGELES, [Pampanga] the Philippines, Dec. 27. (AP)-A caricature show-
ing the United States Ambassador, William McCormick Blair Jr., straddling
a bomb was burned today at a rally demanding Mr. Blair's recall and the re-
moval of American military bases from the Philippines.
About 2,000 persons attended the rally, prompted by the recent fatal shoot-
ing of two young Filipinos on United States military bases and a controversy
over a bomb hurled into an elementary school's yara at Clark Air Force Base.
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extensive coverage. For example, almost two weeks after the Subic
Bay incident, a leading Manila daily devoted the first two pages of a
Saturday "Christmas weekend" issue entirely to the Subic-Clark affair.13
Where there is no status of forces-type agreement, however, such
incidents are potentially even more explosive because of the lack of
clearly defined jurisdictional rules under international law. As to ship-
board crimes, for example, Mr. Justice Stone's observation concerning
the jurisdictional rules governing visiting merchant ships is equally
true with regard to visiting warships, "There is not entire agreement
among nations or the writers on international law as to which sov-
ereignty should yield to the other when the jurisdiction is asserted by
both." 'H And of the jurisdictional rules governing visiting naval forces
ashore, Mr. Colombos states, with typical British restraint, "The posi-
tion of officers and crew when ashore is not quite free from doubt." 15
Having in mind the possible international conflicts of criminal juris-
diction which may arise in the absence of an applicable status of forces-
type agreement, the purpose of this article is to briefly develop, define,
and illustrate the current rules of jurisdiction prescribed by interna-
The N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1965, p. 1, col. I, reported:
MANILA, Jan. 25-About 5,000 workers, students and representatives of
peasant groups staged a demonstration in front of the United States Embassy
tonight. A cardboard "Uncle Sam" was burned at the embassy gate.
There has been widespread irritation in the Philippines over the shooting
of trespassers at United States bases. The protests have grown into a demand
that President Diosdado Macapagal seek a treaty revision that would give
Philippine courts jurisdiction over Americans involved in incidents with Fili-
pinos on and off the bases.
l3 The Philippine Free Press of Dec. 26, 1964, devoted its front page to a
half-page editorial cartoon picturing an American soldier holding a smoking ma-
chine gun and surrounded by dead Filipinos and to a half-page editorial entitled
"SPECIAL RELATIONS" which stated, in part:
Forty-one Filipinos have been killed by American soldiers, according to a
Filipino official. Have the killers been tried? We do not know. Were the
Filipinos killed guilty of a capital offense that they should be killed? If a
Filipino picked empty shells, should he be shot down like a dog by an
American soldier?
Page two contained a full-page article headlined, "KILLINGS AT U.S. MILI-
TARY BASES-Two Filipino 'Intruders' Were Shot Dead by U.S. Military
Guards. American Authorities Have No Duty To Give Special Protection To
Those Who Do Their Country A Disservice." Pictures of visiting Navy ships and
of the American Ambassador were captioned, respectively, "U.S. WARSHIPS
AT SUBIC BAY-Extraterritorial rights" and "AMBASSADOR BLAIR-Could
be overruled."
14United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 158 (1933).
15
COLOaBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 251 (5th ed. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as Coioi sos].
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tional law for the disposition of crimes committed aboard a visiting
warship' i and ashore by the ship's crew.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
A. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS UNDER DoMEsTic LAW.
Each State in the international community generally establishes a
number of different courts "to handle a part of... [its] judicial busi-
ness." 17 At least one such court is legally invested under domestic law
with the power to try accused persons and criminal charges. When a
State court can try both the accused person and the criminal charge
brought before it in a particular case, it is said to have criminal juris-
diction under domestic law.
In re Gilbert'8 illustrates an unsuccessful attempt to prosecute an
American marine in both civil and military courts wherein each court
ruled it lacked the requisite criminal jurisdiction under domestic law.
In 1944 Gilbert, while on guard duty at the entrance to Admiral In-
gram Camp, part of an American military base temporarily established
16The term "warship" is used but not defined in the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 1958. The term, however, is
defined as follows in the Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 1958, art. 8,
para. 2:
For the purposes of these articles, the term "warship" means a ship belonging
to the naval forces of a State and bearing the external marks distinguishing
warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commis-
sioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and
manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline.
In the Lone Star, a criminal case involving crewmen of a World War II armed
American merchant ship, the 10th Criminal District Court of Rio de Janerio held
that as the vessel was armed she was an auxiliary warship. The Brazilian Federal
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning:
We have to determine the essential nature of the status of the Lone Star,
which, though possibly commanded by an officer on active service or a mem-
ber of the reserve of the American Navy, carried a cosmopolitan crew com-
posed of Dutch, Estonians, English, Turks, Spaniards, Greeks and nationals
of Honduras. . . . Though she is armed for urgent defense and sailing in
convoy under the official control of the United States, yet she is not in
fact anything more than an armed freighter operated by a State marine cor-
poration. However, for a ship to be classified as public and-a subdivision of
this category-to be characterized as military, the classical rules have estab-
lished that not only the command but also the crew and the war flag must be
those of the country concerned (Hague Conventions of 1898 and Brussels
Convention of 1928 ... ).
[1947] Ann. Dig. 84, 88 (No. 31).
'TJassup, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JuRISDIcTION 135
(1927).
18Supreme Federal Court, Nov. 22, 1944, DIARIO DA JusTicA, Aug. 21, 1945,
S Jurisprudencia 2969 (No. 190), [1946] Ann. Dig. 86 (No. 37) (Braz.).
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in northern Brazil during World War II, shot and killed a local na-
tional. The United States and Brazil had not entered into a status of
forces-type agreement. The local police first sought to prosecute Gil-
bert in the Third Criminal District Court of Recife but the court "de-
clared itself to be without jurisdiction owing to the military nature of
the crime." 19 Gilbert was then brought before the Military Judge of
the Seventh Military Region but he
declined jurisdiction on the ground that under Brazilian law both
offender and victim were civilians and that the crime occurred
without the camp although "within the sphere of supervision and
guardianship of the marine Gilbert." 20
In view of this "negative conflict of jurisdiction," 2 the military court
submitted the question of its jurisdiction to the Brazilian Supreme
Federal Court. Speaking for a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Falcao
ruled:
[I]t is my duty to judge correct the present refusal of the Brazil-
ian authorities to acknowledge jurisdiction and to declare compe-
tent the military courts of the United States to try and judge the
American sailor in question.22
He reasoned that under international law the Brazilian courts had no
right to exercise Brazil's territorial jurisdiction over Gilbert's crime and
that under domestic law "there is no way in which he can be made
subject to Brazilian military penal law." 2
B. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.
1. Jurisdiction Over Crimes Generally. A State has jurisdiction under
international law over a crime when it is competent under interna-
tional law to prosecute and punish for an act or omission made an




2 2DiR1o DAL JusTc.A., Aug. 21, 1945, § Jurisprudencia 2969 (No. 190), as trans-
lated in King, Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly For-
eign Armed Forces, 40 AM. J. IN-'L L. 257, 263, (1946).23 DiARio DA JUsTc%, Aug. 21, 1945, § Jurisprudencia 2969 (No. 190), [1946] Ann.
Dig. at 88-89.
24Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime, arts. 1(b), I(c), 29 Am. J. INr'L L. Sur'. 435, 439 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime].
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Gilbert the Brazilian civil court had had jurisdiction under domestic
law over both Gilbert's person and alleged crime, there would still have
been the further requirement that the court also have jurisdiction
under international la'w. For "it is clear ... that the sovereign cannot
confer legal jurisdiction on his courts ... when he has no such juris-
diction according to the principles of international law." 25 While a
sovereign "has such power so far as his own territory is concerned
... such extension will not be recognized by other sovereigns." 26
Each State under the principles of international law has jurisdiction
over the following:
a. Any crime "committed within its own territory," 27 whether
commenced and consummated within, commenced within but con-
summated without,2 8 or commenced without but consummated
within its own territory.
2 9
b. Any crime "committed in whole or part upon a public or
private ship . . .which has its national character," 30 whether on
the high seas or in foreign waters.
31
c. Any crime "committed outside its territory ... [by a] per-
son who was a national of that State when the crimes was com-
mitted or who is a national of that State when prosecuted or pun-
ished .... , 32
d. Any crime committed by a member of its armed forces.
25Bcale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REv. 241, 243
(1923).
261d. at 244.
27Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 479 (1956).
28This is "the so-called subjective territorial principle." Jurisdiction With
Respect to Crime, art. 3, comment, 29 AM. J. INr'L L. Supp. at 484. See. e.g., The
Tennyson where Brazil asserted "jurisdiction over an explosion on a British
vessel on the high seas, the explosive instrumentalities having been placed on
board in Brazilian waters." Id. at 487.
29This is "the so-called objective territorial principle." Jurisdiction With Re-
spect to Crime, art. 3, comment, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. at 487. "The setting in
motion outside of a State of a force which produces as a direct consequence an
injurious effect therein, justifies the territorial sovereign in prosecutig the actor
when he enters its domain." 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED
AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 798 (2d ed. 1945) [hereinafter cited as HYDE].
See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 624 (1927).
30Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, art. 4, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. at
439.
31See, e.g., United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818), which
involved the murder of a Navy cook's mate on board The Independence. Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall stated that the proposition that the "government . . .has
power to punish an offence commited by a marine on board a ship of war,
'wherever that ship may lie, is a proposition never to be questioned in this
court." Id. at 390. (Emphasis added.)
.32Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, art. 5, 29 Ams. J. INT'L L. Svpp. at
440.
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Regarding a State's jurisdiction over crimes committed by its armed
forces, it should be noted that the United States Congress, when en-
acting the Uniform Code of Military Justic 3 in 1950, specifically
provided that this "code shall be applicable in all places." 3 This pro-
vision for extraterritorial applicability, however, was not necessary.
As the United States Supreme Court said in Kinsella v. Krueger,
3 5
the UCMJ is "applicable beyond any constitutional question to all
servicemen stationed abroad." 6
Where a national has committed a crime while serving abroad in
his State's armed forces, that State's exercise of jurisdiction over his
crime is merely an example of jurisdiction based upon the nationality
principle.37 Aliens, however, frequently also serve in a State's armed
forces.38 Nevertheless, "the relationship established when an alien be-
comes a member of the military services of a state gives the state juris-
diction to prescribe rules governing the conduct of the alien, notwith-
standing the fact that such membership does not make him a national
of the state." 39 Thus in Chung Chi Cheung v. The King,40 where
a cabin boy (a British national) had murdered the ship's captain (also
a British national) aboard an armed Chinese customs cruiser while in
3 3Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 1-140, ch. 169, 64 Star. 107 (1950)
(now 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964)) [hereinafter cited as UCMJI.
34UCMJ, art. 5, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 110 (1950) (now 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1956)).
35351 U.S. 470 (1956).
36d. at 478.
3 7E.g., United States v. Sinigar, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 330, 336, 20 C.M.R. 46, 52 (1955).
38E.g., BLOOIFIELD, INTEmAmONAL MILITARY FoRcEs 4-5 (1964).
Admiral Nelson's own flagship at the Battle of Trafalgar-H.M.S. Victory
-was crewed by Englishmen, Scotsmen, Irishmen, Welshmen and various
islanders, and the following: twenty-two Americans, seven Dutchmen, six
Swedes, three Frenchmen, two Danes, three Norwegians, one Russian, three
Germans, two Swiss, two Portuguese, four Italians, two Indians, one African,
nine Vest Indians, and four Maltese.
3 9
REsTATENMENT § 31, comment b (1965). "X, a national of State A, is a
member of the military service of state B. While stationed in A, X assaults a
fellow-member of the service. B has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law mak-
ing such action criminal." Id. illustration 3. In Puhl v. Commandant, No. 4062
H.C., D. Kan., Sept. 14, 1966, the accused, a member of the United States armed
forces but a citizen and legal resident of West Germany, had been convicted
by general court-martial for an offense committed in West Germany. In ruling
on his petition for habeas corpus, the Federal District Court said:
Petitioner being a member of a regular component of the armed forces at the
time in question, it follows that he was at that time amenable to the juris-
diction of a military court-martial convened under the Uniform Code with-
out regard to what his citizenship may have been.
40[1939] A.C. 160 (P.C. 1938) (Hong Kong). For a discussion of this case see
Note, 53 HARv. L. REV. 497 (1940), Note, 51 JURID. REv. 177 (1939), Note, 2 REs
JuDicATA 75 (1939), Note, 6 SOL. 28 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Chung Chi
Cheung].
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British territorial waters, the Privy Council held that "the Chinese
Government could clearly have had jurisdiction over the offence." 41
2. Exclusive and Concurrent Jurisdiction. When a member of a
visiting naval force commits a crime punishable only by the domestic
law of the visiting State or of the territorial State, such State has
exclusive criminal jurisdiction under international law. This rule is
recognized, for example, in the following two NATO Status of Forces
Agreement provisions:
The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right
to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the mili-
tary law of that State with respect to offences .. .punishable by
the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving
State.
42
The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exer-
cise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force . .. with re-
spect to offences... punishable by its law but not by the law of
the sending State.43
However, when the visiting and territorial States each has jurisdiction
over the crime under its own domestic laws, such States are said to
have concurrent criminal jurisdiction under international law.
When a serious crime is committed aboard a visiting warship or
ashore by a member of its crew, and when both the visiting and ter-
ritorial States have jurisdiction over the crime, an international conflict
of jurisdiction may arise. If it does, the key question to be answered
is: Which State has the primary right to exercise its concurrent juris-
diction? Although this question has not infrequently been framed,
"Which State has jurisdiction?", this wording tends to confuse the real
issue. In Ministere Public v. Korakis,44 the Egyptian Mixed Court of
Cassation, being careful to distinguish between a State's concurrent
jurisdiction and a State's primary right to exercise such jurisdiction,
"pointed out that it was not a question of the existence of jurisdiction,
411d. at 176. 2 GIDEL, LE DROIT INTfERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 292 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as GIDEL] states:
If the author of the unlawful act is a member of the crew, the flag state has
exclusive jurisdiction. The quality of member of the crew predominates over
all other circumstances, even if the individual author of the offense is a
national of the riparian state.
42Art. VII, para. 2 (a). (Emphasis added.)
4 3Art. VII, para. 2 (b). (Emphasis added.)44Dec. 11, 1944, 57 BULILrIN DE LEGISLATION ET D JURISPRUDENCE EGYPTIEN-
iNEs 66 (1944-45), [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 120 (No. 34).
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for each sovereign State possessed and preserved its own jurisdiction,
but of the exercise of jurisdiction .... ," 45
When one of two States with concurrent jurisdiction extends to the
other State what has been called "international courtesy," the answer
to this key question, of course, is moot. For example, "where the
offence is a minor one, it is usual as a matter of comity to hand the
offender over to the commanding officer for disciplinary action." 4
Thus Smith writes:
[I] t is the usual practice to return to the ship members of the crew
who may have committed minor offenses, such as drunkenness or
disorderly conduct, since it is more convenient that such cases
should be dealt with by naval discipline.4 7
On the other hand, where the offense is more serious, the extending
of "international courtesy" usually depends upon the circumstances of
the case. As Smith notes:
In the event of a member of the crew committing a more serious
offence, such as killing or seriously injuring an inhabitant, it is
for the shore authorities to decide what to do with the offender.
In many cases they will be content to accept the assurance of the
captain that the accused man will be tried by naval court martial
and that he will be adequately punished, if convicted. But it
should be made quite clear that they are under no obligation to
take this course, and there may well be special reasons, such as
the question of bringing witnesses, which may make it desirable
that the case should be tried on shore.
4
8
4 ,Id. at 67, [1943-45] Ann. Dig. at 121.
46BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIoNs 269 n.2 (6th ed. Waldock 1963) [hereinafter
cited as BRIERLY]. 2 MOORE, A DIGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 587 (1906) [here-
inafter cited as MOORE], quotes as follows from a letter of the Brazilian Minister
of Foreign Affairs dated May 31, 1847:
A young officer of the French navy committed an act of disorder in the
house of a public woman, which he entered forcibly, against her will; and,
having been arrested by the police, his commander, through the medium of
the charg6 d'affaires of France, before the prosecution was begun, solicited
his delivery, with the assurance that he would be corrected on board of his
ship. He was immediately given up, and the charg6 d'affaires himself thanked
the Imperial Government for this act of kindness.4 7SzrIr, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 30 (2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited
as SArn]. "The practice in Great Britain appears to be that . . . in case
of minor offences, such as drunkenness, the offender is simply detained until
he can be handed over to a superior officer of the ship to which he belongs, but
this is done as a matter of courtesy." HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249-50 n.1 (8th
ed. Higgins 1924) [hereinafter cited as HALL].48 Smtn 30-31; accord, BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 177 (4th ed. 1949);
I OPPEMnEIM, IN-TERQATIONAL LAW 855 n.3 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955) [herein-
1.967]
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It is not unusual, however, to find instances where "international cour-
tesy" has been extended by the territorial State in cases involving
very serious offenses. Thus Colombos reports:
In September 1926, when a seaman of the U.S. destroyer Sharkey
died in England as a result of wounds received in a shooting affray
with another seaman of the U.S. destroyer Lardner in the out-
skirts of Gravesend, the British Government consented, on the
application of the American Ambassador in London, and as a
matter of international courtesy, to hand over the culprit to the
American authorities, although he had already been convicted by
a coroner's jury of 'wilful murder.' In the statement issued by the
Home Secretary, the opinion of the British Government was
expressed that 'in the special circumstances of this case, a United
States tribunal would be the more convenient Court,' particularly
in view of the 'assurance given by the Ambassador' that the guilty
person would be dealt with in accordance with the U.S. Navy
Court-martial Regulations. 'In coming to this decision, the Secre-
tary of State had in mind the fact that both the accused and the
injured seaman belonged to the U.S. Navy and that no British
subject was directly concerned.' 49
Likewise, if one of the two States waives its right to exercise its
jurisdiction, no international conflict of criminal jurisdiction arises.
Similarly, if one of these States-for any one of a number of reasons
-is unable to exercise its jurisdiction, no conflict of criminal jurisdic-
tion arises. Thus Lord Atkin stated in Chung Chi Cheung:
[1f a resident in the receiving State visited the public ship and
committed theft, and returned to shore, is it conceivable that,
when he was arrested on shore, and shore witnesses were neces-
sary to prove dealings with the stolen goods and identify the
oftender, would the local Courts have no jurisdiction? What is the
captain of the public ship to do? Can he claim to have the local
national surrendered to him? He would have no claim to the wit-
after cited as OPPENHEIM]. 2 MooRE 587 quotes as follows from a letter of the
Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs dated May 31, 1847:
In 1842, two midshipmen of the squadron of Admiral Hugon fought a duel
at Naples, in a room of a hotel, and were seized and tried. The French am-
bassador requested their discharge; the King refused, and the admiral
weighed anchor and prepared to go to sea. The King, however, still refused
to deliver them up, and they were tried and condemned; after which he par-
doned them, and ordered them given up to the admiral.
49CoLomaos 251-52. "[B]ut it is unlikely that the request would have been
granted if the man killed had been a local inhabitant." SMrrH 31.
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nesses, or to compel their testimony in advance, or otherwise. He
naturally would leave the case to the local Courts
0
However, if both States seek to exercise their concurrent jurisdiction
over a particular crime, an international conflict of jurisdiction arises.51
To resolve each such conflict there is a rule of international law pro-
viding that one State is deemed to have waived not its concurrent
jurisdiction over the particular crime but its primary right to exer-
cise such jurisdiction. Thus the Egyptian Mixed Court of Cassation
observed in Anne v. Ministere Public:Z;2
Without doubt the jurisdiction of the territorial power arising in
accordance with its own laws is subject to the recognized rights of
the foreign military authorities in question, but only in accordance
with the limits imposed by international law regarding the exercise
of that jurisdiction.ra
The fact that a State is deemed to have waived its primary right
to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction does not mean, however, that
at a later date it cannot properly exercise its secondary right to do so.
As the Restatement on the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
notes:
IVaiver of the right to exercise enforcement jurisdiction by the
teritorial state is for the convenience and efficiency of the foreign
force and is predicated on the assumption that the military au-
-o[ 1939] A.C. at 174.
'The problem here concerns conflicts not in "prescriptive jurisdiction"
(i.e., "the capacity of a state under international law to make a rule of law")
but in "enforcement jurisdiction" (i.e., "the capacity of a state under interna-
tional law to enforce a rule of law"). R rATMENT § 6, comment a. Indeed, the
problem here considered can arise only when both the visiting and territorial
States have the "prescriptive jurisdiction" to make the act in question an offense
and have exercised that jurisdiction. In this article the term "criminal jurisdic-
tion" rather than the term "enforcement jurisdiction" has been used since the
former is the term generally used by courts in deciding cases wherein the exer-
cise of enforcement jurisdiction has been challenged. Thus in Japan v. Smith
High Court of Osaka (6th Criminal Division), Nov. 5, 1952, [1952] Int'l L. Rep.
221, 222 (No. 47), the court said:
[Ilt is in principle agreed that if a sailor belonging to a foreign warship
goes ashore on official business and, while on that business, commits a crime,
his home State has jurisdiction over him. In no other case is there a limitation
on Japanese criminal jurisdiction.52Dec. 13, 1943, 57 BuLLE-IN DE LmISLATON ET DE JURISPRUDENcE EGYPTIENNES
52 (1944-45); [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 115 (No. 33).
53M. at 54; [1943-45] Ann. Dig. at 118. (Emphasis added.)
19671
22 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
thorities will exercise jurisdiction. If they fail to do so, the terri-
torial state has a right to exercise jurisdiction. If the military
courts of the sending state exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in
a reasonable and responsible manner..., the courts of the terri-
torial state do not normally exercise secondary jurisdiction. How-
ever, the exercise of such jurisdiction, in the absence of an agree-
ment precluding it, is not a violation of international law.
5 4
III. EVOLUTION OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION OVER VISITING NAVAL FORCES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. THE DOCTRINE OF EXTERRITORIALITY.
Space does not permit more than a brief discussion of the evolution
of the rules of criminal jurisdiction over visiting naval forces under
international law. It suffices to say that between about 1400i 5 and
1850 the evolution of these rules was influenced primarily by the
doctrine of exterritoriality. In 1845, Ortolan-a French publicist and
former naval officer-gave perhaps the classic statement of that doc-
trine as regards visiting warships. Such a ship, said Ortolan, is but
a movable fortress, bearing on its breast a portion of the public
power of the state .... [Als to these ships the international cus-
tom is constant. The laws, the authorities, and the jurisdictions
of the state in whose waters they are anchored, remain foreign to
them. They have with that state but international relations, by
the voice of the functionaries of that locality competent for such
relation.50
Ortolan, citing Wheaton 7 and Vattel,-5 concluded
6
4 ESTATEMENT § 59, comment e. (Emphasis added.)
55See, e.g., HALL 237 n.1.
561 ORTOLAN, RFGLES INTERNATIONALES ET DIPLOMATM DE LA MER 214 (3d ed.
1856), as translated in Gregory, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Ships in Territorial
Waters, 2 MIcH. L. Rxv. 333, 341 (1904) [hereinafter cited as ORTOLAN].
57WHmAToN, INTuONATniOAL LAW (8th ed. Dana 1866) (Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace "The Classics of International Law" No. 19,
1936). Citing Casaregis, the Italian publicist, Wheaton stated at 128, "A foreign
army or fleet, marching through, sailing over, or stationed in the territory of an-
other State, with whom the foreign sovereign to whom they belong is in
amity, are . . . exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place."
Casaregis, in his DIscuRsus DE CoMIMERcIo (1740), "concedes exclusive jurisdiction
to a sovereign over the persons composing his naval and military forces and over
his ships, wherever they may be, on the ground that the exercise of such juris-
diction is necessary to the existence of a fleet or army." HAL 237.5 8VA'rruL, LAw op NATiONS (1758) (Carnegie Institute of Washington, "The
Classics of International Law" No. 4, 1916).
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that crimes .. committed on board a vessel of war in a foreign
port, or territorial waters, by members of the crew, or any one
else, fall solely under the jurisdiction of the tribunal of the nation
to which the war ship belongs, and are tried according to the laws
of that nation.69
Thus, according to this view, a visiting warship was a temporary en-
clave of the flag-State, surrounded by but yet completely without the
littoral State's territorial waters. While the flag-State had exclusive
jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board its warship, the lit-
toral State had neither territorial jurisdiction with respect to any
such crime nor the right to serve its process on board.
This doctrine-sometimes referred to as the "French rule," " the
"high doctrine of exterritoriality," 61 the "extreme doctrine of ex-
territoriality," 02 and the fiction of "extra-territoriality" 6-had a sub-
stantial number of adherents until just before World War II, especially
on the Continent and in countries deriving their jurisprudence from
the Civil Law. It was this doctrine, for example, which was adopted
in 1898 at The Hague by the influential Institute of International
Law. 6
B. SCHOONER EXCHANGE AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED IMMUNITIES.
In 1880 Lord Justice Brett, speaking of the exemption accorded
visiting warships and other public ships, said that "the first case to
be carefully considered is, and always will be, The Exchange." 65 The
preeminence of Marshall's opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. M-
Faddon6 resulted not because of a lack of earlier precedents67 but
591 ORTOLAN 298, as translated in Gregory, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Ships in
Territorial Waters, 2 Micti. L. REv. 333, 344 (1904).
OGregory, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Ships in Territorial WVaters, 2 MIcH. L.
REv. 333, 341 (1904).
O1Chung Chi Cheung, [1939] A.C. at 172.
021d. at 170.
631 HALLACK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 232 (4th ed. Baker 1908).
64Regulations Concerning the Legal Status of Ships and Their Crews in Foreign
Ports, art. 16, para. 1 (Aug. 23, 1898), 17 ANrNuaRE DE L'INsrTTrr DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 277 (1898); RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE Or INTERNATIONAL
LAw 147 (Scott ed. 1916) [hereinafter cited as Regulations (1898)]. Those ap-
patently responsible for the draft of these regulations were all from the Continent.
RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSnTUrE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 143-44 (Scott ed. 1916).
65The Parlement Beige, 5 P.D. 197, 208 (1880). In The Prins Frederik, how-
ever, when the King's Advocate cited The Schooner Exchange to Lord Stowell,
he asked, '%Vhere do you find that case?" and upon being given the source did
not follow the precedent. 2 Dodson's Adm. Rep. 451. 462 (1820).
6611 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) [hereinafter cited as The Schooner Ex-
change].
67See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 121 (1795); Ketland v.
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because "Marshall for the first time gave the rule its definite expres-
sion and modern legal form, so that from it we obtain today the
acknowledged international law on the subject." 08
Schooner Exchange arose out of an attempt to libel the French
warship Le Balaou No. 5-formerly The Exchange, an American mer-
chant schooner-while she was in Philadelphia for repairs. Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's famous decision that a visiting warship "should be
exempt from the jurisdiction of the [territorial] country" 69 was based
not on the doctrine of exterritoriality ° but on what might be called
"the doctrine of implied immunities." Marshall reasoned that "the juris-
diction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute," that "all exceptions ... to the full and complete power
of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent
of the nation itself," that "this consent may be either express or im-
plied," that "all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice,
in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and com-
plete jurisdiction within their territories which sovereignty confers,"
and that "this consent may, in some instances, be tested by common
usage, and by popular opinion, growing out of that usage." 71 Marshall
stated that there is "a class of cases in which every sovereign is under-
stood to wave [sic] the exercise of part of that complete exclusive ter-
ritorial jurisdiction ... .," 72 In discussing his third example of this "class
of cases," the case of a foreign army passing with consent across the
territory of a host State, Marshall reasoned:
The grant of a free passage therefore [1] implies a waiver of
all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and [2] per-
mits the foreign general to use that discipline, and to inflict those
punishments which the government of his army may require. 3
The Cassius, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 365 (1796) (same case). In these decisions the
United States Supreme Court held that a visiting warship "could not be libeled in
our courts on the theory that the property of a sovereign and independent nation
must be held sacred from judicial seizure." ZIEGLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
JoHN MARSHALL 85 (1939).
68ZIEGLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL 86-87 (1939).
0911 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 147.
70See, e.g., Chung Chi Cheung, [19391 A.C. 160, 170.
7111 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
72 d. at 137.
731d. at 140. Vattel earlier stated Marshall's "third case" as follows in 3 VAtTEL
bk. III, ch. VII, § 130, 276 (1758):
The grant of a right of passage includes the grant of whatever is naturally
connected with the passage of troops, and of those things without which it
could not take place; this includes ... the right to exercise military discipline
over soldiers and officers ....
CRIMES OF VISITING NA VAL FORCES
It is clear that Marshall was here speaking of the territorial State
impliedly waiving its right to exercise its jurisdiction over the visiting
State's armed forces, not of divesting itself of a portion of its territorial
jurisdiction and temporarily ceding it to the visiting State. As Mr.
Justice Story stated in The Santissima Trinidad:74
In the case of the Exchange, . . . the exemption of public ships
• . . was not founded upon any notion that a foreign sovereign
had an absolute right, in virtue of his sovereignty, to an exemption
of his property from the local jurisdiction of another sovereign,
when it came within his territory; for that would be to give him
sovereign power beyond the limits of his own empire. But it
stands upon principles of public comity and convenience, and arises
from the presumed consent or license of nations, that foreign pub-
lic ships coming into their ports, and demeaning themselves ac-
cording to law, and in a friendly manner, shall be exempt from
the local jurisdiction. 75
Marshall therefore concluded that a public armed ship
constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under
the immediate and direct command of the sovereign; is employed
by him in national objects. He has many and powerful motives for
preventing those objects from being defeated by the interference
of a foreign state. Such interference can not take place without
affecting his power and his dignity. The implied license, therefore,
under which such vessel enters a friendly port, may reasonably
be construed, and it seems to the court, ought to be construed, as
containing an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign,
within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality.76
Schooner Exchange made a major contribution to the development
of the rules of jurisdiction over visiting naval forces. Nowhere was its
effect more profound, however, than in the United States. The change
regarding the right to serve process aboard a visiting warship provides
a striking illustration. In 1794, The Nautilus, a British warship, visited
Newport, Rhode Island, to take on provisions. The Rhode Island Gen-
eral Assembly, being advised that several Americans were unwillingly
detained on board, sent a delegation to investigate. Finding the ship's
captain ashore unsuccessfully seeking provisions, the delegation ob-
7420 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822).
751d. at 352-53.
7611 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 143.
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tained from him-while he was apparently acting under some personal
constraint-a letter directing the senior officer aboard to afford the dele-
gation every assistance. Six Americans were found. After the ship's
captain discharged them, he was able to obtain his needed supplies. The
British minister in Washington complained that "the insult" was "un-
paralleled, since the measures pursued were directly contrary to the prin-
ciples which in all civilised states regulate cases of this nature." "' These
"principles" were colorfully stated in 1637 in The Victory:h
That, as well by the lawe of nations and the seas, as by the use
and custome observed and kept, time beyond the memory of man,
the ship or shipps of any King or royal fleete lying or arriving
within the jurisdiction of any other prince or potentate in league
and amity with the King, owner of such shipps or ship royall,
ought not to be visited, molested, searched, or questioned, crim-
inally or civilly, by the officers of that prince within whose juris-
diction the said shipps or ship are.., and by the said lawes and
customes, and by the right and power of the imperiall crowne of
England his Majesty, and his noble progenitors, Kings of England
for times immemoriall, have had the said preminory [sic, qy. pre-
eminence] and freedome acknowledged and yeelded in all ports
and havens of princes, their allies, that their royall shipps and ship
of any of their royall natives [sic, qy. majesties] have.., bin held
free, and so acknowledged, from any such arresting, entry, visi-
tation, and search, in as full a manner as if they had bin within
the ports and havens of their owne dominions."9
Attorney General Bradford, in an opinion to the Secretary of State,
wrote that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship-
of-war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into
which he comes" and therefore he "cannot claim that extraterritorial-
ity which is annexed to a foreign minister and to his domicil; but is
conceived to be fully within the reach of, and amenable to, the usual
jurisdiction of the State where he happens to be." 80 Mr. Bradford
77HAiL 239.
78Adm. Ct. Libels 92 (No. 258), reprinted in 1 MARSDEN, DocumENTs RELATING
To LAW AND CUSTOMS OF THE SEA 496 (No. 1637) (Publications of the Navy Rec-
ords Society No. 49, 1915).
791bid.
801 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 47, 47-48 (1794). Compare The Favorite, 1 Os. ATT'y
GEN. 87 (1799). In 1795, federal officers of the New York Customs House
searched The Favorite, a French warship, "and seized arms and ammunition on
board of her belonging to the French republic, suspected to be intended for ex-
portation." In reply to the French minister's complaint that this search and seiz-
ure was "an infraction of the law of nations, which nothing could justify," the
CRIMES OF VISITING NAVAL FORCES
further opined "that a writ of habeas corpus might be legally awarded
in such case, although the respect due to the foreign sovereign may
require that a clear case be made out before the writ be directed to
issue." 81
In 1799, this rule was also applied to The Chesterfield, a British
warship visiting New York. When an effort was made to serve process
on board, the ship's captain "assaulted the ministerial officer of justice
as he was leaving the ship, by attempting to remove the plank and
throw him into the water." In reply to a Presidential inquiry, Attorney
General Lee, having considered "the general laws of nations, the treaty
of London between the United States and Great Britain, and the
laws and usages of the United States," opined "that it is lawful to
serve civil or criminal process upon a person aboard a British ship-of-
war lying in the harbor of New York .... 11 82
After Schooner Exchange, however, the Attorney General applied
a wholly different rule. In 1854, for example, The Sitka, a prize cap-
tured from Russia by Great Britain during the Crimean War, sailed
into San Francisco with a British Navy prize crew and a group of
Russian prisoners on board. A California State court issued a writ of
habeas corpus to produce the Russians in court but when the writ was
served upon the British captain, he set sail without obeying the writ's
order. When this matter was referred to Attorney General Cushing,
he stated:
Our courts have . . . adopted unequivocally the doctrine that a
public ship of war of a foreign sovereign, at peace with the United
States, coming into our ports and demeaning herself in a friendly
manner, is exempt from the jurisdiction of the country. She re-
mains a part of the territory of her sovereign.... So long as they
[the Russian prisoners] remained on board that ship, they were in
the territory and jurisdiction of her sovereign .... [T] he courts of
the State of California had no jurisdiction whatever as to these
prisoners on board the Sitka.... The ship which he [the British
captain] commanded was a part of the territory of his country;
it was threatened with invasion by the local courts; and, perhaps,
President said "that he highly disapproved that a public vessel of Nvar, belonging
to a foreign nation, should be searched by officers of the customs upon a
suspicion of illicit commerce; that the ground of suspicion should have been
represented to the consul of that nation, or the commander of the vessel." Id. at
90.
811 Ops. Ar'- GEN€. 47, 48 (1794).
821 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 87 (1799).
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it was not only lawful, but highly discreet in him to depart, and
so avoid unprofitable controversy.8 3
It should be noted that while the first portion of Mr. Cushing's opinion
was based upon Marshall's ruling in Schooner Exchange, the last por-
tion was based upon the high doctrine of exterritoriality. Marshall's
ruling, however, was based not upon the high doctrine of exterri-
toriality but upon the doctrine of implied immunities. As Lord Atkin
stated in Chung Chi Cheung:
The extreme doctrine of exterritoriality was not in issue in
Schooner Exchange..., and neither the principles enunciated by
Marshall ... , nor his application of them, appears to support it.84
Mr. Cushing's 1855 statement of the doctrine of exterritoriality
stands relatively alone in American law.8 5 Occasionally jurists8" and
writers 7 have stated what superficially appears to be the doctrine.
Thus, Mr. Justice Gray, in his dissent in Tucker v. Alexandroff,88
quoted with approval the following statement by Judge Phillimore of
the British High Court of Admiralty:
Long usage and universal custom entitle every ship to be con-
sidered as a part of the State to which she belongs, and to be
exempt from any other jurisdiction .... 89
Generally, however, jurists and writers do not intend by such language
to expound the doctrine of exterritoriality but rather to point out that
for jurisdictional purposes only an American vessel is being assimilated
to American territory. As Barton points out:
The expression [i.e., "the traditional language of exterritoriality"]
is now used sometimes as a convenient legal abbreviation for juris-
dictional immunity, and, if properly understood, no objection can
be taken to it"°
837 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 122, 130-32 (1855).
84[1939] A.C. at 170.
85For two other opinions which rely on the fiction of exterritoriality see gen-
erally 1 McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 90-91 (1956).
86See, e.g., Mr. Justice Stone in United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-56
(1933).
87See, e.g., SoULE & McCAuLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR NAVAL OFFICERS 19
(3d ed. Bright) (1928); Neese, U.S. Navy Ships in Foreign Ports, JAG J. 7, 8
(March-April 1960).
88183 U.S. 424 (1901).
89Id. at 457, citing 1 PHILLIMORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 476 (3d ed. 1889).
90Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Qualified Jurisdictional lImnunity, 31 BI.
YB. INT'L L. 341, 349 n.4 (1954).
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C. CHUNG CHI CHEUNG v. THE KING.
In this landmark pre-World War II case, the British Privy Council
applied Marshall's doctrine of implied immunities to a very serious
crime committed aboard a visiting armed public vessel. Cheung, a
cabin boy serving on The Cheung Keng, an armed Chinese maritime
customs cruiser then in British territorial waters off Hong Kong, shot
and killed the ship's captain and then attempted suicide. Both Cheung
and his captain were British nationals. After Cheung's release from a
local hospital, he was tried for and convicted of murder at the Ordinary
Criminal Sessions of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong despite his
counsel's argument that this court, under the doctrine of exterritorial-
ity, lacked jurisdiction.
Cheung's appeal to the Full Court of Appellate Jurisdiction of Hong
Kong was dismissed. After noting "the change in the attitude of in-
ternational jurists as to the reasoning underlying this universally con-
ceded immunity, and the trend of modern writers towards the opinion
that it is a freely accorded waiver by one sovereign state of part of its
complete sovereignty," this appellate court ruled:
If this opinion is the correct one it necessarily follows that the
guest state and the host state have concurrent jurisdiction, but
that, as a matter of international comity, the jurisdiction of the
host state is postponed to that of the guest state .... [The defense
counsel's] proposition that the jurisdiction of the visiting state is
sole and exclusive is one to which we are unable to accede.91
Cheung's appeal to the Privy Council also failed, their Lordships
agreeing that he had no valid objection to the trial court's jurisdiction.
Said Lord Atkin:
9129 Hong Kong L.R. 22, 29 (1937). (Emphasis added.) There was also here
a rather unique situation which made it especially difficult for the court to accede
to the defense counsel's proposition. Noted the court at 30:
By the Treaty of Tientsin 1858 the Emperor of China renounced all claim
to exercise jurisdiction within his territorial limits over British subjects. The
requisition for the surrender of the appellant was doubtless inspired by the
belief that the appellant, a person of Chinese parentage, with a Chinese name,
and employed on board a Chinese vessel, was a national of China. The
moment that the appellant established affirmatively . . . that he was not a
national of China proceedings for his extradition failed. The Chinese au-
thorities in effect are claiming to exercise a jurisdiction which they had sur-
rendered in 1858. In these circumstances, if the appellant's plea to the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court of this Colony were upheld, the appellant, so
long at least as he remains in Hong Kong, would not be answerable to any
Court for the murder which he has committed.
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On the question of jurisdiction two theories have found favour
with persons professing a knowledge of the principles of interna-
tional law. One is that a public ship of a nation for all purposes
either is, or is to be treated by other nations as, part of the terri-
tory of the nation to which she belongs. By this conception will
be guided the domestic law of any country in whose territorial
waters the ship finds herself. There will therefore be no junisdic-
tion in fact in any Court where jurisdiction depends upon the
act in question, or the party to the proceedings, being done or
found or resident in the local territory. The other theory is that
a public ship in foreign waters is not, and is not treated as, terri-
tory of her own nation.... In this view, the immunities do not
depend upon an objective exterritoriality, but on implication of the
domestic law. They are conditional, and can in any case be waived
by the nation to which the public ship belongs.
Their Lordships entertain no doubt that the latter is the correct
conclusion. It more accurately and logically represents the agree-
ments of nations which constitute international law, and alone is
consistent with the paramount necessity, expressed in general terms,
for each nation to protect itself from internal disorder by try-
ing and punishing offenders within its boundaries.
9 2
After examining the criticisms of the doctrine of exterritoriality by
Cockburn,93 Hall,9 and Brierly,95 Lord Atkin concluded:
[We] have no hesitation in rejecting the doctrine of exterritorial-
ity expressed in the words of Mr. Oppenheim, which regards the
public ship "as a floating portion of the flag-State." ... The truth
is that the enunciators of the floating island theory have failed to
face very obvious possibilities that make the doctrine quite imprac-
ticable when tested by the actualities of life on board ship and
ashore.06
92[1939] A.C. at 167.
93Lord Chief Justice Cockburn's criticism, part of the famous Cockburn Memo-
randwm prepared during the Fugitive Slave Controversy of 1876, is generally dis-
cussed in Chung Chi Cheung, [1939J A.C. at 171-72.94HAL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (1st ed. 1880).
95BIuERLY, TiH LAW OF NATIONS 110 (1st ed. 1928).
96[19391 A.C. at 174. Oppenheim's following provision has generally been in-
terpreted as supporting the rule that a visiting State has exclusive jurisdiction
over all crimes committed aboard its warships while in foreign waters:
The position of men-of-war in foreign waters is characterised by the fact
that they are called 'floating portions of the flag-State.' For at the present
time there is a customary rule of International Law, universally recognized,
that the State owning the waters into which foreign men-of-war enter must
treat them in every point as though they were floating portions of their flag-
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Lord Atkin then applied, although not expressly, Marshall's doc-
trine of implied immunities, stating:
The true view is that, in accordance with the conventions of in-
ternational law, the territorial sovereign grants to foreign sover-
eigns and their envoys, and public ships and naval forces carried
by such ships, certain immunities. Some are well settled; others are
uncertain.... In relation to ... the crew of a warship, it is evi-
dent that the immunities extend to internal disputes between
the crew. Over offences committed on board ship by one member
of the crew upon another, the local Courts would not exercise
jurisdictionY.
But here the local court did exercise such jurisdiction and the Privy
Council affirmed its action. To reach this result Lord Atkin reasoned
that "the Chinese Government could clearly have had [i.e., exercised
its] jurisdiction over the offence" but that the circumstances of this
case "make it plain that the British Court acted with full consent of
the Chinese Government." 98
The rule of Chung Chi Cheung was thus summed up by Lord
Atkin:
Here [there] is no question [of the visiting State] saying [to the
territorial State] you may treat an offence committed on my terri-
tory as committed on yours. Such a statement by a foreign sover-
eign would count for nothing in our jurisprudence. But a [visit-
ing] sovereign may say [to the territorial State], you have waived
your jurisdiction in certain cases, but I prefer in this case that you
State. Consequently, a man-of-war, with all persons and goods on board, re-
mains under the jurisdiction of her flag-State even during her stay in foreign
waters .... Crimes committed on board by persons in the service of the
vessel are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the commander and the other
home authorities. Individuals who are subjects of the littoral State and are
only temporarily on board may, although they need not, be taken to the home
country of the vessel, to be punished there, if they commit a crime on board.
1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 764-65 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1948). (Emphasis
added.) In Lauterpacht's final edition, he revised Oppenheim's above-quoted
provision to eliminate the italized portion and to add the following two italized
phrases:
The position of men-of-war in foreign waters is characterised by the fact
that, in a sense, they are 'floating portions of the flag-State.' The State own-
ing the waters into which foreign men-of-war enter must treat them, in
general, as though they were floating portions of their flag-State.
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"91iould exercise it. The original jurisdiction in such a case flows
afresh. 9
D. TH MIXED COURTS OF EGYPT.
The Mixed Courts of Egypt, created by Great Britain just before
World War II to exercise part of Britain's exterritorial jurisdiction in
Egypt, functioned throughout the war and decided a number of cases
involving crimes committed ashore by crewmen of visiting Allied
warships.Y°° These courts have been aptly described as "the most
fecund source of jurisprudence on the question of the exercise of crim-
inal jurisdiction by local courts over members of a visiting force." 101
Gaitanos v. Ministere Public'0 2 presents the most common factual
situation: a visiting warship's crewman arrested while ashore on liberty
for an offense over which both the visiting and territorial States have
criminal jurisdiction. In upholding the local court's right to exercise its
concurrent jurisdiction, the Mixed Court of Cassation stated that this
was merely "a case where an ordinary crime has been committed by
a sailor ashore." 103
In Orfanidis v. Ministere Public,1°4 however, the offender returned
from liberty to his ship without being arrested, whereupon the local
authorities requested he be surrendered for investigative purposes. His
commanding officer complied but covered himself with the following
letter:
991d. at 176. A similar rule was suggested by the Institute of International Law
in its Reglement sur le Regime des Navires de Mer et de leurs Equipages darns
les Ports etrangers en Temps de Paix (1928) [hereinafter cited as Regulations
(1928) 1, art. 18 of which provided:
Crimes and offenses committed on board warships, whether by members of
the crew or by any other persons on board, are withdrawn from the exercise
of the competence of the courts of the State of the port, as long as the ship is
there, whatever be the nationality of the perpetrators or the victims. Never-
theless, if the commander delivers the delinquent to the territorial authority,
the latter shall regain the exercise of its normal competence.
34 ANNUARE DE L'INsTITUT DE TRoIT INTRNATIONAL 742 (1928), as translated in
STANGER 66 n.18. (Emphasis added.) '
' 0 0See generally, Brinton, Jurisdiction Over Members of Allied Forces in Egypt,
38 AM. J. INT'L L. 375 (1944); Brinton, The Egyptian Mixed Courts and Foreign
Armed Forces, 40 AM. J. INTL L. 737 (1946).
' 1DBarton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction, 27
BRIT. YB. IuT'L L. 186, 255 (1950).
1O2June 29, 1942, 54 BuI.ETINx DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE EGYPTIENNES
257 (1941-42), [191942] Ann. Dig. 169 (No. 87).
1031d. at 258, [1919-42] Ann. Dig. at 170.
104May 31, 1943, 55 BuLLEaIN DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE EGYPTIENNES
168 (1942-43), [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 141 (No. 38).
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In accordance with your request I hand over to you, for the pur-.
pose of investigation only, the sailor Jean Orphanidis [sic], with
the express reservation that you surrender him to me after the
investigation has been completed so that he may be tried by the
Greek authorities to whose jurisdiction he is subject.les
Instead of being surrendered after the investigation was completed,
Orfanidis was tried and convicted in a local court. The Mixed Court of
Cassation, however, disapproved this exercise of jurisdiction, holding:
[I] f the sailor regained his warship, whatever the reason might be,
without having been arrested by the local authority, he was al-
ready protected by the immunity from jurisdiction recognized as
belonging to the warship. The surrender of the offender for the
sole purpose of investigation did not imply renunciation of the
benefit of this immunity. 106
In Ministere Public v. Korakis, °7 while Korakis et al. were arrested
before they could return to their ship, the local police thereafter turned
them over to the Greek military police without apparent reservation.
When the local authorities sought to prosecute, the trial court sustained
a defense objection to the court's jurisdiction. The Mixed Court of
Cassation dismissed the prosecutor's appeal, ruling:
[XV]here the local authority, having arrested the offenders, sur-
renders them to the commander of their ship without reservation,
the courts of the flag State recover the exercise of their jurisdic-
tion.1
0O
Among the most important decisions of the Mixed Courts of Egypt
were two interpreting the service commande exception. As stated by
the Institute of International Law in 1928, this rule provides:
If the members of the crew ashore on official duty (service com-
mande) ... commit .. . crimes ashore, the local authority may
proceed to arrest them but should hand them over to the captain
if he should demand their surrender. 10 9
1O51d. at 169, [1943-45] Ann. Dig. at 142.
iogIbid.
107Dec. 11, 1944, 57 BULLETIN DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENcE EGYPTIENNES
66 (1944-45), [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 120 (No. 34).
lOSld. at 68, [1943-45] Ann. Dig. at 122.
1O9Regulations (1928), art. 20, para. 3, as translated in [1919-42] Ann. Dig, at
167-68.
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Ministere Public v. Triandafiloul"o involved a sailor arrested ashore for
carrying a concealed weapon and stabbing a local policeman. His
crimes took place shortly before midnight just after he had emerged
in a drunken condition from a bar. During his trial by a local court
the sailor produced a certificate from his captain stating he had left
his warship charged with a mission ashore, to wit: the purchase of
ship's provisions, with leave to report back on board by midnight. The
Mixed Court of Cassation quashed his conviction, interpreting the serv-
ice commande exception as follows:
The only reason why the members of the crew of a warship enjoy
any immunity ashore is that they are carrying out orders relative
to the needs of the ship. In effect it is a case of extending the
immunity of the ship itself outside the ship for the purpose of
meeting its needs. This is the basis of the principle which with-
draws these members of the crew from the local jurisdiction when
they are on a mission (service commande). Furthermore, these
last words should be interpreted not with regard to the actions of
him who has received the order but with regard to him who gave
the order and who is concerned with its execution. In the present
case... Triandafilou had not yet returned to his ship to give an
account of his mission, and he was therefore still engaged on the
mission when he committed the offense charged.
11'
Judge Brinton, the American member of the Mixed Court of Cassa-
tion, has provided this further insight into the court's reasoning in
Triandafilou:
As to whether the seaman was at the time of the offense engaged
in a service commande the court ... held that the question de-
pended not on the intrinsic character of the offender's act or on
his own state of mind but on the nature of the orders under which
he was serving, a test which placed him within the scope of the
exception."i 2
A few months later, in Ministere Public v. Tsoukharis,13 another
11OJune 29, 1942, 54 BULLETIN DE LEGIsLATIoN ET DE JURISPRUDENCE EGYPTIENNES
259 (1941-42), [1919-421 Ann. Dig. 165 (No. 86). Another English translation
appears in 39 AM. J. INr'L L. 346 (1945).
"'Id. at 260, [1919-42] Ann. Dig. at 169.
112Brinton, Jurisdiction Over Members of Allied Forces in Egypt, 38 AM. J.
INT'L L. 375, 379 (1944).
113Feb. 8, 1943, 55 BULLETIN DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE EGYPTIENNES
89 (1942-43), [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 150 (No. 40).
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service conmiande case, the Mixed Court of Cassation made this clarify-
ing statement regarding the Triandafilou principle:
Applying this principle it seems clear that the person giving the
order is interested in the report of the person sent, whereas the
latter is interested in prolonging the duration of the mission. If
therefore there is no report to make there is no order in question,
and a soldier who abuses his mission to prolong his leave will cease
to be covered by immunity from jurisdiction.114
IV. RULES OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER
VISITING NAVAL FORCES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. RULES REGARDING CRIMINAL JURISDIcTION.
1. Exclusive Jurisdiction. Under international law a visiting State
has exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes, punishable by its laws but
not by those of the territorial State, which are committed in whole or
in part aboard one of its visiting warships" or ashore by the ship's
crew."10 On the other hand, under international law the territorial
State has exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes, punishable by its laws
but not by those of the visiting flag-State, which are committed in
whole or in part aboard a visiting warship"17 or ashore by the ship's
crew. 18 The term "warship" includes "boats, tenders, and all appur-
tenances of a ship of war." 119
2. Concurrent Jurisdiction. Under international law the visiting and
territorial States have concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes, punish-
able by the laws of both States, which are committed in whole or
in part aboard a visiting State's warship 120 or ashore by the ship's
crew.
121
1141d. at 91, [1943-45] Ann. Dig. at 152.
11See, e.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 2 (a); Jurisdiction
With Respect to Crime, art. 5, 29 Amr. J. INTL' L. Supp. at 439.
1"0 See, e.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 2(a); cf.
Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 478 (1956); United States v. Sinigar, 6 U.S.C.
M.A. 330, 336, 20 C.M.R. 46, 52 (1955).
117 See, e.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 2(b).
118 See, e.g., note 116 supra.
1111 PHILLIMORF, INTERNATIONAL LAW 479 (3d ed. 1889).
I'OSee, e.g., Chung Chi Cheung, [1939] A.C. 160; Reference As To Whether
Members Of The Military Or Naval Forces Of The United States Of America
Are Exempt From Criminal Proceedings In Canadian Criminal Courts, [1943]
Can. Sup. Ct. 483, [19431 4 D.L.R. 11 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Exemption of
United States Forces]; NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 1;
Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, art. 3, 4, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Su'p,. at 439-40.
121See, e.g., Exemption of United States Forces, [1943] Can. Sup. Ct. 483,
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B. RULES REGARDING THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE CRI NAL JURISDICTION.
1. Visiting State's Right to Exercise Exclusive or Concurrent Juris-
diction. Under international law a visiting State has the right to exer-
cise within its own territory and on the high seas its exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes committed in whole or in part
aboard one of its visiting warships or ashore by the ship's crew. How-
ever, a visiting State generally has no right to exercise any criminal
jurisdiction 'within the territorial State for "a state's jurisdiction to
take enforcement action within its territory is normally exclusive." 12
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "A sovereign nation
has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed
within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender
its jurisdiction."
There are, however, a few exceptional situations under international
law wherein the territorial State is deemed to have conferred on a
visiting State a limited right to exercise criminal jurisdiction 'within
the territorial State.124 One such situation is where the territorial State
gives its consent, express or implied, for another State's warship to
visit within its territory. Unless it expressly indicates otherwise, in-
ternational law deems that the territorial State impliedly confers on
the visiting State a right to exercise criminal jurisdiction 'within its
territory. This right, however, is very limited. First, it may only be
exercised on board a visiting State's warship. 2 5 Second, it may only be
exercised against members of the visiting State's armed forces.126 And
third, it may not be exercised to inflict "major punishments such as the
death penalty." 127
[1943] 4 D.L.R. 11 (1943); Ministere Public v. Korakis, Mixed Court of Cassa-
tion, Dec. 11, 1944, 57 BULLETIN DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE EGYPTIENNES
66, 67 (1944-45), [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 120, 121 (No. 34). RST=ATEmENT § 57, com-
ment b, states:
An act that violates the law or disciplinary rules of the sending state as well
as rules of criminal law of the territorial state subjects the actor to the
jurisdiction of both states.
1
2 2
REsTATEMENT § 20, comment b.
123Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957).
'12 RESTEMENT § 20, comment b.
125See, e.g., BRIERLY 268; SNOW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2d ed. Stockton 1898)
[hereinafter cited as SNow]; RESTATEMENT § 32; cf. The Schooner Exchange, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 140 (1812) (dictum); Exemption of United States Forces,
[19431 Can. Sup. Ct. 483, 524, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 11, 48 (1943).
126See, e.g., RESTATEMENT § 32; cf. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 140 (1812) (dictum); Exemption of United States Forces, [1943] Can. Sup.
Ct. 483, 524, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 11, 48 (1943).
127See, e.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 7(a); RrSTrTE-
MENT § 49, comment e. Contra, SNOW 24; cf. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 140 (1812) (dictum).
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A visiting State's right to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over
crimes committed aboard a visiting 'warship is subject, however to an
additional limitation: the territorial State retains the primary right to
exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over all such crimes except for the
following three types committed by members of the visiting State's
armed forces:
Crimes solely against the property or security of the visiting
State.
Crimes solely against the persons or property of other members
of the visiting State's armed forces.
Crimes arising out of an act or omission done in the perform-
ance of official duty.
A visiting State's right to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over
crimes committed ashore by its crew is also subject to an additional
limitation: the territorial State retains the primary right to exercise its
concurrent jurisdiction over all such crimes except those arising out
of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty.1 2
The visiting State may, of course, expressly or impliedly waive its
primary right to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over a crime fall-
ing within one of these four categories whereupon the territorial
State "shall regain the exercise of its normal competence." 129 For ex-
ample, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn opined that
offences committed on board as between members of her crew
towards one another.., should be left entirely to the law of the
ship, and that should the offender escape to the shore, he should, if
taken, be given up to the commander of the ship on demand, and
should be tried on shore only if no such demand be made.130
2. Territorial State's Right to Exercise Exclusive or Concurrent
Jurisdiction. Under international law the territorial State has the right
to exercise within its own territory its exclusive or concurrent jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed in whole or in part aboard a visiting war-
'28See, e.g., 2 MooRE 585 which quotes as follows from a letter of the Secre-
tary of State dated July 23, 1794:
The officers of a vessel of war belonging to a friendly foreign nation can not
set up extra-territoriality when unofficially on shore in a port in whose harbor
their vessel is temporarily moored. (Emphasis added.)
l29Regulations (1928), art. 18.
l3OCockburn Memorandum, as quoted in Chung Chi Cheung, [1939] A.C. 170,
172.
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ship or ashore by the ship's crew, 31 subject to one limitation: this
jurisdiction may not be exercised aboard a visiting warship. 132 In fact,
"no official of the territorial State is permitted to board the vessel
against the wishes of her commander." 133
Of course, if the territorial State is able to arrest the offender while
he is ashore, then it can exercise its jurisdiction over his crime. On the
other hand, if the shipboard offender remains aboard or if the shore
offender regains his ship and stays there, the territorial State may
then have considerable difficulty in exercising its jurisdiction. 3 4 What
might it do? First, since "immunity from the local jurisdiction may
.. . be waived," 135 the territorial State may seek the visiting naval
commander's permission to arrest the offender, to serve him with crim-
inal process, or to have him surrendered to the local authorities.13 6
However, "the commander of a foreign man-of-war is not bound to
131See, e.g., 2 MooRE 588 which quotes as follows from a letter of the Secretary
of State dated Jan. 27, 1872:
[Any person . . . attached to such a man-of-war, charged with an offence
on shore, is liable to arrest therefor in the country where the offence may
have been committed.
13 2See, e.g, 2 HYDE 826 which states, "At the present time a foreign vessel of
war and the occupants thereof are acknowledged to be exempt from local proc-
ess." However, RESTATEMENT § 49(a) states that the territorial State does not
impliedly waive its right to exercise its jurisdiction aboard a visiting warship "to
the extent necessary to prevent injury to persons or property not involved in
the operation of the vessel." RESTATEMENT § 49, comments b and c, set forth
the following examples:
1. A naval vessel of state A comes into a port of state B after having re-
ceived consent to its visit by B. X, a crewman murders a fellow crewman,
Y. The authorities of B board the vessel and arrest him. . . . B's action
is not a lawful exercise of its jurisdiction.
2. Same facts as in Illustration 1, except that X, while aboard, threatens
to throw a grenade into a crowd of bystanders waiting on the pier to visit
the vessel. The police of B go aboard and subdue X. . . .B's action is a
lawful exercise of its jurisdiction.
13 COLOMBos 242; accord, 1 OPPENqHEIM 853-54.
134See, e.g., 2 HYDE 826, 829 which states:
No occupant while remaining on board is subject to the local jurisdiction, not-
withstanding his infraction of the local criminal code by an act committed on
shore or taking effect there. . . .When a fugitive from justice is once re-
ceived on board a foreign vessel of war within the territorial waters of a
State he is believed to be withdrawn from the local jurisdiction.
1352 HYDE 827.
ll61bid. However, Smirm 31 states that "it is not easy to imagine a case in which
the captain of a British warship would be justified in handing over to the local
courts a member of his crew charged with a crime committed on board ship."
In this regard, United States Navy Regulations (1948), art. 0730, provides:
The commanding officer shall not permit his command to be searched by
any person representing a foreign state nor permit any of the personnel
under his command to be removed from the command by such person, so
long as he has the power to resist.
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give up anyone on board .... ,, 137 Second, the territorial State may
make a diplomatic request for the offender's surrender or exercise its
right under an extradition treaty with the visiting State.138
A territorial State's right to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over
crimes committed aboard a visiting warship and ashore by the ship's
crew is subject, however, to an additional limitation: the visiting State
has the primary right to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over all
crimes within the four previously mentioned categories.
A territorial State may, of course, expressly or impliedly waive its
primary right to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over a crime fall-
ing outside these four categories. An implied waiver results, for ex-
ample, where the local authorities fail to make a timely request for
the surrender of an offender being held aboard a visiting warship. 3 9
C. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE RULES REGARDING THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE
CONCURRENT CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES COMMITTED
"ABOARD" A VISITING WARSHIP. 1 40
I. A visiting warship's officer, while aboard ship, steals the ship's
chronometer. The visiting State has the primary right to exercise its
concurrent criminal jurisdiction.'
4'
Cf. United States Navy Regulations (1948), art. 0764, relating to foreign cus-
toms and immigration inspections.
1-72 MooRE 588, citing a letter of the Secretary of State dated Jan. 27, 1872.
'3 SSee, e.g., 2 MooRE 579 which cites the following case:
In 1871 Rear-Admiral Boggs, U.S. Navy, commanding the European fleet,
refused to give up certain persons on board who were charged by the Italian
authorities with larceny. Mr. Fish [the Secretary of State], while observing
that any person attached to a foreign man-of-war was liable to arrest on
shore for an offense there committed, said: 'In the event that a person on
board a foreign ship should be liable to be given up, pursuant to an extradi-
tion treaty, the commander of the vessel may give him up if such proof of
the charge should be produced as the treaty may require. In such case, how-
ever, it would always be advisable to consult the nearest minister of the
United States. This was done in this instance, and the decision of Mr. Marsh
that the persons demanded were not liable to be given up, pursuant to the
treaty with Italy, is approved by the [State] Department.'
laoCf. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 130 (1933).
14 01t should be noted, however, that under the "high doctrine of exterritorial-
ity" (i.e., "the floating island theory") the visiting State has exclusive jurisdic-
tion-not merely primary or secondary jurisdiction-over all crimes committed
aboard a visiting warship. See note 96 supra.
4'4 See, e.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 3(a) (i); Regu-
lations (1928), art. 18; Regulations (1898), art. 16, para. 1; Cf. United States v.
Thierichens, 243 Fed. 417 (E.D. Pa. 1917). As to offenses of this type, the 1940
Montevideo Treaty on International Penal Law provides:
Crimes perpetrated on board men-of-war . . . of one State, while these are
in the territorial waters of another State, shall be tried by the tribunals, and
1967]
40 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
2. A visiting warship's crewman, while aboard ship, steals a ship's
document classified "Confidential" intending to sell it to a foreign
agent. The visiting State has the primary right to exercise its con-
current criminal jurisdiction.142
3. A visiting warship's crewman, while aboard ship, either unlaw-
fully kills the ship's commanding officer or steals the navigator's person-
al chronometer. The visiting State has the primary right to exercise its
concurrent criminal jurisdiction.1
43
4. A visiting warship's crewman, while posted as bow sentry, un-
lawfully shoots and kills a local national who has come alongside in
a sampan and is stealing tools from a ship's small boat, the sentry be-
lieving that the use of such force is justified to protect military prop-
erty.144 The visiting State has the primary right to exercise its con-
current criminal jurisdiction.145
5. A visiting warship's crewman, while on duty as coxswain of one
of the warship's small boats,146 negligently collides with a sampan and
kills two local nationals. The visiting State has the primary right to
exercise its concurrent criminal jurisdiction.147
6. A visiting warship's crewman, while aboard ship but not on duty,
commits an unaggravated assault and battery upon a local launder-
man. The territorial State has the primary right to exercise its con-
current criminal jurisdiction but will probably recognize the ship's
disciplinary jurisdiction in this case.148
punished according to the laws, of the State to which the said men-of-
war ... belong.
March 19, 1940, tidle I, art. 9, para. 1; 8 HUDsoN, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 482,
486 (No. 582) (1949), 37 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 122, 125 (1943) [hereinafter cited
as the 1940 Montevideo Treaty].
1421bid.
' 43See, e.g., Chung Chi Cheung, [1939] A.C. 160; NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, art. VII, para. 3(a) (i); Regulations (1928), art. 18; Regulations
(1898), art. 16, para. 1.
' 44 See Peck, The Use of Force to Protect Govermnent Property, 26 MI. L.
REv. 81 (1964) (DA Pam 27-100-26, 1 Oct. 1964).
145See, e.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 3 (a) (ii); Reg-
ulations (1928), art. 18; Regulations (1898), art. 16, para. 1; 1 OPPENHEIM 845. In
United States v. Thierichens, 243 Fed. 419, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1917), the Federal Dis-
trict Court said:
[Clourts will not assume jurisdiction over such vessel or its officers, while
acting as such, but leave controversies arising out of the acts of the vessel,
and its officers, while acting in their official character, for settlement through
diplomatic channels.
' 46"The rules as to ships apply to all . . . boats . . .belonging to vessels of
war and detached therefrom upon any service .. . ." SNow 23.
1478ee, e.g, note 145 supra.
' 4 See, e.g., Exemption of United States Forces, [1943] Can. Sup. Ct. 483, 499-
500, 527, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 11, 23-24, 51; NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art.
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7. A visiting warship's crewman, while aboard ship, assaults with in-
tent to commit rape or actually rapes a local female ship cleaner. The
territorial State has the primary right to exercise its concurrent criminal
jurisdiction but will probably recognize the ship's disciplinary juris-
diction in this case.
149
8. A visiting warship's crewman, while aboard ship, kills a local
female ship cleaner while attempting to rape her. The territorial State
has the primary right to exercise its concurrent criminal jurisdic-
tion.150
9. A local launderman, while aboard a visiting warship, steals either
the ship's chronometer or the navigator's personal chronometer. The
territorial State has the primary right to exercise its concurrent crim-
inal jurisdiction.115
VII, para. 3 (b); Cox.omnos 250. Contra, Japan v. Smith, High Court of Osaka
(6th Criminal Division), Nov. 5, 1952, [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 221 (No. 47) (dictum);
Gregory, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Ships in Territorial Waters, 2 MICH. L. REv.
333, 343-44 (1904); 1940 Montevideo Treaty, title I, art. 9, para. 1; Regulations
(1928), art. 18; Regulations (1898), art. 16, para. 1; BRIrTON & WATSON, INTERNA-
TIONAL LA. FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 104 (2d ed. 1960); 1 OPPENHEIM 854; SNOW
24. In this regard, the Cockburn Memorandum, as quoted in Chung Chi Cheung,
[19391 A.C. 160, 172, states:
But if a crime be committed on board the ship upon a local subject ...
the criminal ... should be given up to the local authorities.
1-Tlbid.
lGObid.
15ISee, e.g., Chung Chi Cheung, [19391 A.C. 160, 174 (dictum); NATO Status
of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 3 (b); 1940 Montevideo Treaty, tide I, art. 9,
para. 2; 1889 Montevideo Treaty on International Penal Law, Jan. 23, 1889, title
I, art. 9, para. 3, 18 Martens, N.R.G. (20 s6r.) 432, 434, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Sup'p.
at 638-39 (1935); STANGER 68; cf. 2 GruEL, LE D~orr INTERNATIoNAL PUBLIc DE LA
MER 293-94 (1934). Contra, Regulations (1928), art. 18; Regulations (1898), art. 16,
para. 1; CoLOmos 250; 1 OPPENHEim 854. In this regard, 2 DE MARTENS, TRAirr
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 337 (1886), states:
No juridical reason exists for declaring that in all cases crimes committed on
warships are excluded from the jurisdiction of the local authorities. One can
admit that the commander of the ship and the crew should not be subject
to such authorities. But for what reason should this privilege be extended to
individuals who, forming no part of the crew, have committed a crime on
board a warship? The exterritoriality of such ships, thus understood, would
become up to a certain point contrary to their own security and would be
in opposition to the rights and the dignity of States in whose water they sail.
As to this type of offense, for example, the 1940 Montevideo Treaty, title I, art.
9, para. 2, provides:
If only persons who do not belong to the crew of the warship . . . partici-
pate in the commission, on board, of such acts, prosecution and punishment
shall be conducted in accordance with the laws of the State within whose
territorial waters the warship ... is located.
In such a case, United States Navy Regulations (1948), art. 0732, requires:
1. The commanding officer shall keep under restraint or surveillance, as
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10. A local launderman, while aboard a visiting warship, unlawfully
kills a local female ship cleaner. The territorial State has the primary
right to exercise its concurrent criminal jurisdiction.
152
11. A visiting warship's crewman, while enroute from ship to shore
in a ship's small boat to go on liberty, unlawfully kills a fellow crew-
man. The visiting State has the primary right to exercise its concurrent
criminal jurisdiction.
153
12. A visiting warship's crewman, while enroute from ship to shore
in a ship's small boat to go on liberty, unlawfully kills a fellow crew-
and battery upon a local launderman. The territorial State has the
primary right to exercise its concurrent criminal jurisdiction but will
probably recognize the ship's disciplinary jurisdiction in this case.Y4
13. A visiting warship's crewman, while enroute from ship to shore
in a ship's small boat to go on liberty, unlawfully kills a local launder-
man. The territorial State has the primary right to exercise its con-
current criminal jurisdiction.15
D. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE RULES REGARDING THE RIGHT TO ExERCISE
CONCURRENT CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES CO MMITTED
"AsHORE" BY A VISITING WARSHIP'S CREW.
1. A visiting warship's crewman, while enroute from ship to shore
in a local water taxi 56 to go on liberty, commits an unaggravated
assault and battery upon a fellow crewman or commits a petty theft
necessary, any person not in the armed services of the United States who is
found under incriminating or irregular circumstances within the command, and
shall immediately initiate an investigation.
4. If the investigation indicates that such person . . . has committed or at-
tempted to commit an offense which requires action beyond the authority
of the commanding officer, he shall at the first opportunity deliver such per-
son, with full descriptive data, fingerprints, and a statement of the circum-
stances to the proper civil authorities.
152See, e.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 3(b); 1940
Montevideo Treaty, title I, art. 9, para. 2; 1889 Montevideo Treaty, supra note
151, title I, art. 9, para. 3; CoLomaos 250; HALL 245 n. 2; STANGER 68; cf. 2
GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA tMER 293-94 (1934). Contra, Regula-
tions (1928), art. 18; Regulations (1898), art. 16, para. 1; 1 OPPENHEIM 854.
153 See, e.g., 136 supra.
154 See, e.g., 148 supra.
1551bid.
1
5 6 "[Wlhen the . . .men of a vessel of war are in shore boats .... the), are
under the local jurisdiction." SNow 23. In The Lone Star, the offenses (disorderly
conduct & failure to pay fare) were committed in a local water taxi while along-
side the offenders' ship. The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court clearly approached
the case as one "in which members of the crew go ashore and commit offences
there." [1947] Ann. Dig. 84, 88 (No. 31).
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of personal property from a fellow crewman. The crime in no way
affects the person or property of a local national. The territorial State
has the primary right to exercise its concurrent criminal jurisdiction
but will probably recognize the ship's disciplinary jurisdiction.r 7
2. A visiting warship's crewman, while ashore on liberty, unlaw-
fully kills a fellow crewman in a local cafe brawl which otherwise re-
sults only in minor property damage to the cafe and minor injury
to a waiter. The territorial State has the primary right to exercise its
concurrent criminal jurisdiction but will probably recognize the ship's
disciplinary jurisdiction since the crime did not substantially affect the
person or property of a local nationall1s
3. A visiting warship's crewman, while ashore on liberty, commits
an unaggravated assault and battery upon a fellow crewman which also
results in serious property damage to the cafe and/or serious injury to
a waiter. The territorial State has the primary right to exercise its
concurrent criminal jurisdiction.15 9
4. A visiting warship's crewman, while ashore on liberty, commits
an unaggravated assault and battery upon a local taxi driver or wrong-
fully appropriates a local national's bicycle. The territorial State has the
primary right to exercise its concurrent criminal jurisdiction.1' °
15TSee, e.g., Exemption of United States Forces, [19431 Can. Sup. Ct. 383, 499,
509, 518, 527, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 11, 25, 33, 42, 51 (1943); 2 MooRE 586; SOULE &
MCCAULEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR NAVAL OFFICERS 19 (3d ed. Bright) (1928).
Contra, 1940 Montevideo Treaty, tide I, art. 9, para 3, which provides:
The laws of the country to which the ship . . . belongs, shall also govern
the trial and punishment of such punishable acts as are committed elsewhere
than on board by members of the crew or by individuals charged with the
exercise of some function on board, when the said acts affect only the dis-
ciplinary order of those ships ....15 8See, e.g., Anne v. Ministere Public, Mixed Court of Cassation, Dec. 13,
1943, 57 BU.LETIN DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE EGYPTIENNEs 52 (1944-45),
[1943-45] Ann. Dig. 115 (No. 33); Gaitanos v. Ministere Public, Mixed Court of
Cassation, June 29, 1942, 54 BULLETIN DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE EGYP-
TiEN rES 257 (1941-42), [1919-42] Ann. Dig. 169 (No. 87); Affaire Der, Cour de
Cassation (Ch. Crim.), Feb. 29, 1868, [1868] Sirey Recueil G6nfral I. 351 (Fr.)
(The Pearl); Regulations (1928), art. 20, para. 1.
599Ibid.
lGOIbid. In Japan v. Smith, High Court of Osaka (6th Criminal Division), Nov.
5, 1952, [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 221 (No. 47), crewmen of the visiting British war-
ship Belfast, while on liberty in Kobe, assaulted a taxi driver, stole his money,
and wrongfully appropriated his taxi. They were convicted of robbery in the
District Court of Kobe. The High Court of Osaka upheld the trial court's juris-
diction, reasoning at 222:
There is certainly no ... limitation [on Japan's criminal jurisdiction] in a
case involving the sailors of a foreign warship who are ashore for their own
purposes. . . . Most writers on international law, though a few entertain
contrary views, admit the home State's jurisdiction over cases of this kind.
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5. A visiting warship's crewman is given an official order by the
supply officer to drive the ship's truck to a farmers market, requisition
500 pounds of fresh produce for the ship, and then return immediately
to the ship to hold an overdue inventory. After requisitioning the
produce, the crewman starts directly back for the ship but while driv-
ing at an exercise rate of speed negligently kills a local policeman. The
visiting State has the primary right to exercise its concurrent criminal
jurisdiction.610 If, however, after requisitioning the produce, he spends
several hours ashore drinking at his favorite bar and then, while driv-
ing back to the ship, negligently kills a local policeman, the territorial
State, instead, has the primary right to exercise its concurrent criminal
jurisdiction.
162
6. A visiting warship's crewman is given an official order by the
supply officer to drive the ship's truck to a farmer's market, requisition
500 pounds of fresh produce for the ship, return to the ship by no
later than midnight, and personally report to the supply officer on the
result of his mission. After requisitioning the produce, he spends sev-
eral hours drinking at his favorite bar. Just before midnight, while driv-
ing back to the ship, he negligently kills a local policeman. The terri-
torial State has the primary right to exercise its concurrent criminal
jurisdiction.163
Such jurisdiction is admitted especially in the Resolutions on 'Rules on the
Position of Ships and their Crew in a Foreign Port in Peace Time' of the
International Law Association of 1928. It is therefore an established principle
that the home State has jurisdiction, and the principle has been supported
by decided cases in many countries.
"16See, e.g., Ministere Public v. Tsoukharis, Mixed Court of Cassation, Feb. 8,
1943, 55 BULLMrN DE LFaxSLATION ET DE JuIusPRUDENcE EGYPTIENNES 89 (1942-
43), [1943-45J Ann. Dig. 150 (No. 40); Ministere Public v. Triandafilou, Mixed
Court of Cassation, June 29, 1942, 54 BULLETIN Ds LEGISLATIO " DE JUIUS-
PRUDENc5 EGYPTiENNES 259 (1941-42), [1919-42J Ann. Dig. 165 (No. 86); Japan
v. Smith, High Court of Osaka (6th Criminal Division), Nov. 5, 1952, [1952]
Int'l L. Rep. 221 (No. 47) (dictum); NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art.
VII, para. 3(a) (ii); Regulations (1928), art. 20, para. 3.
ll21bid.
lesSee, e.g., NATO Status of Forces Agreement, art. VII, para. 3 (a) (ii). Ellert,
The United States as a Receiving State, 63 Dics. L. REv. 75, 89 (1959), states that
the NATO rule requires
something more than the offense was committed during the period while
the accused was on official duty. This additional ingredient is a causal con-
nection between the offense committed and an act or ommission [sic] done in
the performance of official duty.
,Contra, Ministere Public v. Tsoukharis, Mixed Court of Cassation, Feb. 8, 1943,
55 BuuLmN DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISaRUDENCE EGYPTIENNES 89 (1942-43),
[1943-45] Ann. Dig. 150 (No. 40); Ministere Public v. Triandafilou, Mixed Court
-of Cassation, June 29, 1942, 54 BUL. ETIN D LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE
.EoYrtrmNNs 259 (1941-42), [191942] Ann. Dig. 165 (No. 86); Regulations
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7. A visiting warship's crewman, on official duty with the ship's
shore patrol, negligently kills a local policeman while driving a shore
patrol wagon to the scene of a reported serious accident involving the
ship's truck. The visiting State has the primary right to exercise its
concurrent criminal jurisdiction.
16 4
8. A visiting warship's commanding officer, while driving the ship's
sedan in the course of making an official call, negligently kills a local
policeman. The visiting State has the primary right to exercise its
concurrent criminal jurisdiction.165
V. CONCLUSION
Eighty years ago Great Britain's Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in
discussing a controversial rule of criminal jurisdiction over visiting
naval forces, observed, "In which way the rule should be settled, so
important a principle of international law ought not to be permitted
to remain in its present unsettled state." 166 Unfortunately, as Colom-
bos observes, some of the rules in this area are still "not quite free from
doubt." 107
Why have these rules remained for so long in an "unsettled
state"? First, until fairly recently 18 there has been little interest shown
in international conflicts of criminal jurisdiction. General works on
the law of the sea have necessarily given only brief consideration to
this area of international law. For example, McDougal and Burke, in
their monumental work on the contemporary law of the sea,169 while
discussing the immunities of a visiting warship and its crew, gave rela-
(1928), art. 20, para. 3. In Lauterpacht's digest of Triandefilou, he added a
critical note which states, in part:
The judgment of the Court of Cassation adopts an interesting test of whether
the accused is still on a mission, namely, whether he has reported to his su-
periors. It seems clear that Triandafilou was engaged on a "private frolic of
his own" (to use a familiar common law expression) ....
[1919-42] Ann. Dig. at 169. In Japan v. Smith, High Court of Osalca (6th
Criminal Division), Nov. 5, 1952, [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 221 (No. 47), the court said
at 222:
[I]t is in principle agreed that if a sailor belonging to a foreign warship goes
ashore on official business and, while on that business, commits a crime, his
home State has jurisdiction over him.
164See, e.g., note 161 supra.
160,lbid.
lOOCockburn Memorandum, as quoted in Chung Chi Cheung, [1939] A.C. 160,
172.
167CoLomBos 251.
26sSee, e.g., RESTATENT §§ 44-62 which cover the topic, "Conflicts Arising
From Existence Of Concurrent Jurisdiction To Enforce."
1 69McDOUGAL & Buaxu, THa PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962).
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tively little consideration to the very real and highly controversial
conflicts of criminal jurisdiction that can and have arisen during the
visits of warships in foreign ports.
170
Second, when attention has been given to this area, the rules of
criminal jurisdiction have usually been stated in broad, imprecise
terms. For example, the rules proposed in 1898 by the Institute of In-
ternational Law were devoid of such needful terms as "concurrent"
and "exercise." 171 McDougal and Burke were hardly more precise as
to shipboard crimes when they stated:
[S] tates are in complete agreement that the coastal state is without
authority to intervene with respect to conduct aboard warships
in internal waters without the consent of the flag-State. If the
coastal state acquires custody of the accused, as by surrender from
the flag authorities, prescription and application of coastal law is,
of course, permissible.1'72
What is needed, of course, is not an oversimplification based upon
the Privy Council's decision in Chung Chi Cheung but a set of sufli-
ciently inclusive and succinctly stated rules to substantially resolve any
international conflict of criminal jurisdiction which might arise when a
visiting sailor, ashore in a port like Da Nang, Bangkok, Singapore,
Surabaya, Penang, or Rangoon,'73 is responsible not for a relatively
obscure incident like the 1867 Affaire Der in Saigon but for an interna-
tional incident like the 1861 Forte case in Brazil'74 and the 1957 Girard
case in Japan. 7 5
1l0d. at 170-71.
171However, the Institute's Regulations (1928) were substantially improved in
this regard. See note 99 supra. As STANGER 66 n.18 notes, for example, art. 18
"reflects . . .a shift in emphasis from jurisdiction to prescribe to jurisdiction to
enforce."
1 7 2
McDouGAL & BuRE 171.
173See, e.g., Seeing the Sights in Thailand, All Hands, Nov. 1966, pp. 28-29,
an account of the visit of the USS Buchanan (DDG 14), temporary flagship of the
Commander, United States Seventh Fleet, in Bangkok, Thailand.
174 During the 1861 visit of Rear Admiral Warren's flagship, the HMS Forte, in
the port of Rio de Janeiro, three of the ship's officers were arrested while
ashore for alleged intoxication and disorderly conduct and were jailed overnight.
The following morning, after the Chief of Police received an investigative re-
port indicating that "the acts of the English officers were merely the result of the
state in which they were in at the time," they were released. As a result of the
Forte case and another case involving the Prince of Wales, a British merchant
bark, diplomatic relations between Brazil and Great Britain were severed. The
King of Belgium was chosen as an arbitrator and rendered a decision in favor
of Brazil. 5 MooRE, INTERNATioNAL ARBITRATIONS 4925-28 (1898). See also 2 MooaE
587-88.
175See generally Wilson v. Girard, 354 U. S. 524 (1957); Baldwin, Foreign
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"When," as Lord Atkin said in Chung Chi Cheung, "the local Court
is faced with a case where such immunities come into question, it has
to decide whether in the particular case the immunity exists or not.
If it is clear that it does, the Court will of its own initiative give effect
to it." 171 On the other hand, if the status of the claimed immunity is
not considered by the local court to be clear under international law,
the court should be amenable to a reasonable application of a set of
rules of criminal jurisdiction based upon sound precedent and currently
valid concepts of international law.
Over the last 150 years, long accepted legal concepts have been
utilized with increasing frequency and precision to resolve international
conflicts in this general area. In The Schooner Exchange the concepts
of implied waiver of jurisdiction and of immunity from jurisdiction
were applied to international litigants. In Chung Chi Cheung the con-
cepts of concurrent jurisdiction and of the waiver of an immunity from
jurisdiction were approved. In Ministere Public v. Korakis the contro-
versy was evaluated as a conflict of jurisdiction. In Anne v. Ministere
Public177 the inquiry was as to "the limits imposed by international law
regarding the [territorial State's] exercise of that [concurrent] jurisdic-
tion." 178 In the NATO Status of Forces Agreement the drafters utilized
the concept of a "primary right" to exercise concurrent criminal juris-
diction. And in the American Law Institute's Restatement on The
Foreign Relations Law of the United States the concept of "secondary
jurisdiction" 179 (i.e., the secondary right to exercise concurrent crim-
inal jurisdiction) is employed. All of these concepts, of course, are
but legal corollaries of Marshall's doctrine of implied immunities, a
basic principle which determines not whether a particular immunity
from local jurisdiction is actually afforded to a visiting flag-State but
rather how such an immunity comes to be granted and what are its
legal consequences and implications.
In conclusion, an unfortunate example of the misapplication of the
rules in a related area-jurisdiction over crimes committed within the
camp of a visiting armed force-clearly illustrates the importance of a
Jurisdiction and the American Soldier, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 52. Life, July 1,
1957, p. 29, reported, "The international row which got started when SP3/C
William Girard shot and killed a Japanese woman on an Army firing range
[at Camp Weir] in Japan (Life, June 17) had nearly everyone in the act last
week."
176[19391 A.C. 160, 175.
177MLxed Court of Cassation, Dec. 13, 1943, 57 BULLETIN DE L.sIsATIoN ET
DE JuRISpRuDENCE EGYPTENNFS 52 (1944-45), [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 115 (No. 33).
178 Id. at 54, [1943-451 Ann. Dig. at 118.
1 7 ORESTATE/iENT § 59, comment e.
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basic understanding of the jurisdictional rules discussed herein. In 1911,
an American sailor murdered a fellow sailor while "aboard" a United
States Naval Hospital temporarily established in Japan. There then be-
ing no status of forces-type agreement with Japan, as there fortunately
is today, 80 the Japanese authorities jailed the culprit and prepared to
prosecute him in a local court. Ambassador O'Brien apparently had
called to his attention two 1910 cases which arose in Cherbourg,
France, and Gravesend, England, respectively, wherein the local au-
thorities had turned the offenders over to the United States Navy for
disciplinary action. He, therefore, informally requested the Japanese
Foreign Office to allow the United States to take jurisdiction over the
case but his request was denied. He then cabled the State Department
for instructions, mentioning the Cherbourg and Gravesend cases. Mr.
Hackworth, former Legal Advisor for the State Department, records
that Secretary of State Knox cabled Ambassador O'Brien that the
United States had obtained custody of the Cherbourg and Gravesend
offenders only "by courtesy of France and Great Britain" 181 and:
Unless the practice of other nations is contrary, you should con-
cede jurisdiction to Japan, at the same time indicating that this
Government would prefer by courtesy to try the prisoner.1
8 2
Hackworth does not record what Ambassador O'Brien determined
regarding "the practice of other nations" but does record that the sailor
"was later tried and convicted by the Japanese court," '83 a result which
-in view of the facts stated-appears to be based more on an erroneous
concession of jurisdiction than on a correct application of the rules of
criminal jurisdiction under international law.
1S0Administrative Agreement with Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
1652, T.I.A.S. No. 4510.
1812 HACKWORTH, INTrERNATIONAL LAW 422 (Department of State Pub. No. 1521,
1941).
1821bid.
'8,1bid.
